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15. It is possible that the withdrawal of naval forces of this nature in October might involve less loss of prestige than the retreat of a regular military garrison.
16. The Chief of the Naval Staff has undertaken to consult the Naval Commander-in-Chief as to the feasibility of this proposal and the strength of the force required. Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt has been asked to report after conference with the General Officer Commanding Shanghai Defence Force.
17. We feel bound to warn the Cabinet, however, that it would be necessary to withdraw this force in October, when the river falls, if the present tension still continued. The Cabinet must be the judge of the extent to which our prestige would be injured by their withdrawal, and whether, in these circumstances, the immediate advantage to be gained is commensurate with the ultimate disadvantage.
18. In previous Reports we have more than once drawn attention to the forts on the Yangtse at Kiangyin, Chinkiang, Nanking, &c., as a possible danger to the communications of the British and foreign Naval forces and of the communities at Hankow and elsewhere on the river (C.ID. Papers Nos. 784-B, paragraph 14, and 785-B, paragraph 10). We have several times warned the Cabinet that, given time, the Chinese might be able to render these forts effective. There are not lacking signs that this is taking place. As long ago as the 17th March (Telegram No. 983 from Commander-in-Chief, China, to Admiralty) a Chinese gunboat was reported to have been injured by one of the forts at Silver Island: the guns on Lion IIill. Nanking, have frequently been in action. New 6-inch guns are now being mounted close to Golden Island, Chinkiang, and the forts at Hsiang Shan have recently bombarded the forts on the North bank. There has also been much sporadic firing by field guns. machine guns and rifles, on warships and merchant vessels using the Yangtse. In view of these signs of activity the Chief of the Naval Staff has undertaken, on our behalf, to consult the Naval Commander-in-Chief again as to whether he can be sure of maintaining his communications up to Hankow, even if Chiang Kai-shek should turn hostile.
19. On the receipt of the Naval Commander-in-Chief's replies to the telegrams referred to in preceding paragraphs, our Joint Planning Sub-Committee will examine in detail the project of action at Hankow and all relating thereto, and we may then be in a position to submit a further Report.
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.
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20. Our Conclusions and Recommendations may be summarised as follows (a) We adhere generally to the recommendations contained in our Second Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 793-B), and we consider that, as far as possible. latitude should be given to the men on the spot in regard to the method and moment for such reprisals as have been generally approved by IIis Majesty's Government.
(b.) We agree in principle that, in present circumstances, Hankow is the proper place for reprisals, provided that it is not already too late and provided that effective sanctions can be found.
(c) We adhere to the view we have already expressed against the re-occupation of the British Concession at Hankow if it involves the maintenance of a military garrison there. We think it possible, however, that a temporary re-occupation of the Concession, if strongly desired by His Majesty's Government, might be effected by means of parties landed from His Majesty's Ships, reinforced by Marines from Shanghai and, if necessary, by a few troops used as additional landing parties. His Majesty's Government, however, must be the judge as to whether the withdrawal of these Naval forces when the river falls in October would involve a loss of prestige outweighing the immediate advantages to be gained from this step. We reserve a final opinion on the military aspects of this question until we know in greater detail the views and intentions of the Naval Commander-in-Chief both as regards action at Hankow and the main- tenance of the lines of communications in the face of possibly hostile forces on both sides of the Yangtse.
(d.) We recommend that the men on the spot should be given authority to destroy the Hankow Arsenal if and when they think the right moment has arrived for this step, but they should be warned that the selection of the moment for this will depend upon the circumstances attending the re-occupation of the Hankow Concession. For example, if the re-occupation of the British Concession is successful, the need for this operation may not arise. On the other hand, it may be expedient on military grounds to destroy the arsenal before re-occupying the Concession or for its retention. Should it be unnecessary to destroy the arsenal before re-occupying the Concession, its subsequent destruction might serve as an adequate sanction for the purpose of "saving face should the Concession eventually have to be evacuated. These are matters the which the men on the spot alone can judge. When referring to men on the spot," we mean the Naval Commander-in-Chief and the British Minister at Peking, together with the Senior Naval Officers and Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers ready to associate themselves in sanctions.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. I, April 26, 1927.
(Signed)
BEATTY.
G. F. MILNE.
H. TRENCHARD.
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